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1 Introduction
In the analysis of the significant and persistent cross-country diﬀerences in growth rates and economic
development, institutions have been accorded a special role. In this paper, we focus on one important
component of institutional quality - political instability. The negative relationship between political
instability and economic growth is widely accepted as a stylized fact following the work of Alesina
and Perotti (1996) who find that political instability reduces investment, which is a "primary engine
of growth". Similarly, Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) find a negative eﬀect of political
instability on economic growth. There is, however, a notable lack of consensus in the literature on what
the political instability measure captures and how it should be measured. Barro (1991) simply used the
number of assassinations, and the occurrence of violent revolutions and military coups as proxies for
political instability. Alesina and Perotti (1996) extend Barro’s approach and use principal component
analysis to construct a weighted average of the following variables that capture political unrest: mass
violence, political assassinations, coups (both successful and unsuccessful) and a measure of dictatorships.
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996) on the other hand, use the probability of a coup as an indicator
of political instability.
Our analysis of political instability attempts to unbundle the various components of political insta-
bility and examine one particular component of political instability - movements between democratic
and dictatorial regimes. We believe that traditional political instability measures, that capture things
in addition to such transitions, are too broad in scope and may be subject to measurement error. We
draw upon recent theoretical work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a and b, 2000) to construct our
measure of political instability. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that unequal societies move in and out of
democracy, i.e., fluctuate between being democratic and dictatorial. In a democracy with a high degree
of inequality, the government has to meet the huge demands of the majority for redistribution from the
rich to the poor. This results in a large net benefit for the elite to stage a coup and capture power to
put in place a regime that does not allow such redistribution. The flipside of this is exactly the high net
benefit for the poor of starting a revolution to snatch away power from the rich (elite) under a dicta-
torship. When inequality is high, redistributive policies by a dictator are not enough to prevent such a
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revolution. Democratization (or extension of the franchise) will be the only answer in this situation. In
the spirit of this analysis of political transitions, we create a new measure of political instability which
captures movements from dictatorship to democracy and vice versa but does not capture government
changes that preserve the democratic or dictatorial structure of the country.1 Our empirical analysis
shows that while inequality is positively correlated with our measures of political instability as well as
that of Alesina and Perotti, the impact of inequality on the latter is only through components of political
instability as captured by our measure.
Next, we analyze the economic consequences of political instability. We argue that all kinds of
redistributive policies are likely to be more volatile in politically unstable societies. And, indeed we find
that policy volatility is increasing in fluctuations in the degree of democracy. More importantly, we find
that the broader Alesina-Perotti measure of political instability aﬀects policy volatility only through the
components captured by our measures.
While institutions are important for economic development, a question that arises is whether policies,
policy volatility and macroeconomic (in)stability have a role to play as well. In a recent paper, while
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) study the impact of macroeconomic policies on
output volatility, they do not account for the role of volatility of these policies. We find evidence of
a channel where political instability engenders policy volatility, which in turn, gets reflected in greater
output volatility and lower investment. We think this finding is important since output volatility is
harmful for economic growth, as has been demonstrated by Ramey and Ramey (1995), by Aizenman and
Marion (1993 and 1996) for developing countries, and by Fatas and Mihov (2003).2
Our paper makes three contributions: First, we show that inequality is the key explanatory variable
that accounts for fluctuations in countries’ degree of democracy. Second, we show that it is this fluctuation
in the degree of democracy that accounts for volatility of a broad set of policies. Finally, we propose an
alternative link between political instability and economic growth and development — one that operates
through policy and output volatility.
1 We use the term political instability rather than political transition since our measure also captures incremental
movements towards and away from democratization.
2 The reasons that have been provided for these linkages range from delay in irreversible investment under uncertainty,
to the trade-oﬀ between productive activity and unproductive activities such as rent seeking, and social and political unrest.
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2 Theory
In this section, we outline briefly the theoretical set up of Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a), and the
model’s main implications we will be testing empirically. Consider an economy with two groups of
agents, namely the poor and the rich (the elite). We allow the possibility of the political environment
being democratic or nondemocratic. In the democratic state, the tax rate is the most preferred tax rate
of the median voter, who is poor (as the majority are poor). In the alternative, non-democratic regime
the tax rate set is the one that maximizes the utility of a representative rich agent. So when the political
system is nondemocratic to begin with, an attempt at a revolution by the poor results in a decision by
the elite on whether or not to democratize. Similarly, starting from a democracy, the elite will decide
whether or not to stage a coup and capture power that will result in a dictatorship.
We assume that a proportion λ of agents are identical “poor” individuals and the remaining 1 − λ
are identical “rich” individuals (the “elite”). We normalize the measure of the continuum of all agents to
unity and assume that λ > 1/2, i.e., the majority are poor. There is only one consumption good denoted
by y which is produced using asset h. This productive asset is distributed unequally in the economy. A
poor agent has an exogenously given amount hp of the asset while a rich agent has hr. The superscripts
p and r throughout represent variables related to poor and rich respectively. Let θ < λ be the overall
proportion of the economy’s total stock of the productive asset owned by the poor and this parameter
therefore is an inverse measure of inequality in the economy. Thus, we have hr = (1− θ)h/(1− λ) and
hp = θh/λ which represent the asset ownership of a rich and poor individual respectively. We can write
the output or the pre-tax income of an agent as yit = Ath
i for i = p, r where the aggregate productivity
At can take a low value Al = a < 1 or a high value Ah = 1 with probabilities s and 1− s respectively3 .
We assume identical preferences of all agents given by Et
∞P
j=0
βt+jCit+j for i = p, r where C
i
t is
consumption of agent i at time t, β is the discount factor and Et is the expectations operator conditional
on information available at time t. Assuming income taxes to be linear at rate τ t at time t and the
lump sum transfer to be uniform of magnitude Tt, post-tax income of an individual i = p, r can be
written as byit = (1− τ t)Athi + Tt. We assume a deadweight cost of raising taxes given by c(τ t)Ath with
3 Recessions are assumed not to be very common and so s < 1/2. Business cycles have a role to play in this model in
that they aﬀect the opportunity costs of staging coups or attempting revolutions.
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c(0) = 0, c´(0) = 0, c´(τ) > 0 for all τ > 0, c´(1) = ∞ and c´ = 0. The government budget constraint can
therefore be written as Tt = τ tAt[λhp + (1− λ)hr]− c(τ t)Ath = (τ t − c(τ t))Ath.
The society starts in a nondemocratic regime (in period 0) where the poor have no say in the deter-
mination of the tax rate but can attempt a revolution in any subsequent period. The revolution succeeds
only if a minimum threshold fraction of the poor take part. While a certain fraction 1 − µ > 0 of the
income of the economy gets destroyed during the period of the revolution, the poor are able to obtain
an additional fraction π− θ of the asset stock of the economy resulting in a return of of µπAth/λ in that
period and πAth/λ per period thereafter. A revolution is assumed to generate private benefits for a poor
agent and therefore, there is no collective action problem. While a high µ implies that a revolution is
not very costly, a high π implies high returns from it for the poor. It is also assumed that the rich lose
everything after a revolution and therefore, they might prevent it by voluntarily extending the franchise
in which case the country transitions to a democracy and the tax rate is set thereafter through majority
voting, i.e., by the median voter. Once in a democratic regime, the elite have no special voting power
but can attempt a coup which succeeds if there is a minimum threshold participation by the rich. A coup
brings back the status quo but in the process destroys a fraction 1−φ of the economy’s total income for
that period.
Since there are no collective action problems, the game is solved as one between two agents, namely
the elite and the poor, and the Markov Perfect Equilibria of the game are characterized by strategies
that are a function only of the current state and prior actions within the same period. Under the set up
described above, and imposing some reasonable restrictions, Acemoglu and Robinson are able to prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold level of µ given by µ, and two threshold levels of φ given by bφ
and φ such that (1) if µ < µ, the society remains undemocratic; (2) if µ > µ and φ < bφ, the society
democratizes the first time the state is one where there is recession with the elite in power, and then
remains a fully consolidated democracy; (3) if µ > µ and bφ < φ < φ, the society democratizes the first
time the state is one where there is recession with the elite in power, and then remains a semi-consolidated
democracy; and (4) if µ > µ and φ > φ, the society is an unconsolidated democracy and continuously
switches regimes. Importantly, ∂µ /∂θ > 0, ∂φ /∂θ > 0,and ∂bφ /∂θ > 0.
In a consolidated democracy, the threat of a coup has no role to play, while in a semi-consolidated
democracy, the threat of a coup forces the tax rate to be below the median voter’s most preferred level
in an otherwise democratic regime. In the first case in proposition 1, µ is very low and is below the
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threshold level µ which makes revolution very destructive and costly for everybody including the poor
themselves, which in turn makes it unattractive for the poor and ensures that the society that starts
out being undemocratic continues to be so forever. In the second case µ is higher than the threshold
level µ and so the cost of revolution is low to everyone, which makes the incentive for the poor to start
a revolution high. The opportunity cost of initiating a revolution is particularly low during a recession.
Under such conditions, the rich are forced to extend the franchise. Also φ < bφ, which, once we are in a
democratic regime, makes the cost of staging a coup quite high. In the third case, the cost of a revolution
is not high but the cost of a coup, once the society is democratized, is in the intermediate range making
the possibility and threat of a coup quite real and imminent. Thus we move to a democracy where the
tax rate is below the median voter’s optimum to prevent a coup. This is what Acemoglu and Robinson
call a “semi-consolidated democracy”. In the fourth case, µ > µ which means the cost of a revolution
is low but at the same time φ > φ means that the cost of a coup is also low. Neither the coup nor the
revolution is very destructive. Thus, in this case we get continuous switches in regimes.
Finally, ∂µ /∂θ > 0, ∂φ /∂θ > 0,and ∂bφ /∂θ > 0. In other words, an increase in inequality brought
about by an increase in θ reduces µc, φ and φ, which makes the minimum destruction from a coup or
revolution to prevent them from happening higher. Thus at higher levels of inequality, both revolutions
and coups become more attractive. The reason for this is that higher inequality leads to a higher tax
rate or redistribution demanded by the median voter, which increases the diﬀerence between the median
voter’s most preferred tax rate and the elite’s most preferred tax rate. Thus, the parameter space in
which we get swings in political regimes increases. An obvious implication of this is that we continuously
get fluctuations in tax rates and the likelihood of such fluctuations increases with an increase in inequality.
In our empirical work, we will extend this result to fluctuations in both fiscal and trade policies, as both
are used for redistributive purposes. We also will explore how this kind of policy volatility, by creating
an uncertain economic climate, will deter investment. As shown in the literature sluggish investment
negatively aﬀects growth. Thus we are interested in the following chain of links4 :
Income Inequality → Polity Instability (entry into and exit from democracy)
4 Our focus is not so much on the growth results, but mainly on the link from inequality to political instability and
from political instability to policy volatility.
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→ High Trade and Government Spending V olatility → Output V olatility & Low Investment →
Weak Growth
3 Measuring Political Instability
Political instability has been conceptualized very broadly with little agreement on which components
of political instability are the most critical. Barro (1991) uses the number of assassinations, and the
occurrence of violent revolutions and military coups as proxies for political instability. Alesina and Perotti
(1996) extend this approach and use principal component analysis to construct a weighted average of
the following variables that capture political unrest: mass violence, political assassinations, coups (both
successful and unsuccessful) and a measure of dictatorship. Others also focus on the harsher aspects
of sociopolitical changes and diﬀer from each other only in terms of the list of variables used in the
principal component analysis. (See Hibbs, 1973, Veneiris and Gupta, 1986, and Campos and Nugent,
2002, 2003). Here political instability is a bundle of various factors - however, the discrete components
may have varying underlying causes and more importantly, diﬀerent consequences for economic policies
and outcomes.5 Second, not all coups and revolutions are equal - some lead to real changes in the political
system and how preferences of the population are aggregated (in terms of policy outcomes). Others leave
the underlying political system unaﬀected. Examples of the latter would include failed coups (Philippines
in 2006), failed revolutions (Hungary in 1956), as well as successful coups in a dictatorship (Togo in 2005)
which simply change the identity of the person or elite in power with little consequence for the rest of
the country’s population. Third, this approach fails to account for subtle and incremental changes in
political rights and political competition. Incremental restrictions (or easing of such restrictions) on
political rights will not be captured by these measures. For example, we have witnessed a steady erosion
of democratic rights in Kazakhstan since 1991. Finally, many of these measures define political instability
primarily as a move towards dictatorial regimes - instability generated by moves from dictatorships to
democracies is either ignored or underemphasized.
A second way to measure political instability would be to count the number of times a country
5 To the best of our knowledge Campos and Nugent (2002) is the only other paper that tries to distinguish between
moderate and severe sociopolitical instability. They do not find strong evidence for a negative relationship between either
of their measures and economic growth.
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experienced significant changes in its political organization. One could build on the approaches used by
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004), Giavazzi and Tabellini, (2004) and Persson (2005) who identify a
significant change in a country’s political system if the 21 point Polity measure (ranging from -10 to
+10, with smaller values indicating a lower level of political freedom) suddenly changes from a negative
to a positive value (or vice versa). While such a direct approach has its merits in that it is easily
interpretable, the choice of 0 as the crucial threshold between democracy and dictatorship is somewhat
ad-hoc. Moreover, a jump in the Polity measure from -1 to 1 (Honduras in 1979) would be treated
equivalent to a jump from -1 to 9 (Thailand in 1991). Compared to the former, the latter is a significant
move towards democracy. Finer classifications with multiple thresholds would mitigate this problem but
even then we have little to guide us in terms of the number of thresholds to use. Finally, this approach
would also ignore incremental changes in a country’s polity.
For all these reasons, traditional measures of political instability are likely to be plagued by measure-
ment errors insofar that it includes various factors which may not influence the political system (failed
coups or riots for example,) and by failing to capture incremental changes in the country’s Polity. To
circumvent the shortcomings of the traditional measures, we employ a novel methodology to construct
a new measure of political instability. We unbundle the various components of political instability and
focus on one particular component - movements between democratic and dictatorial regimes.
We use annual data from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2000) to estimate the following
dynamic panel regression:






i POLITYit−k + γiWit+ ∈it (1)
where i = 1, ..N ; t = 1, ..., T. 6 We included lagged values of POLITY to capture inertia in the democratic
process while the vector of explanatory variables inW employs the conditioning set used by Robert Barro
(1999). It includes per capita GDP, primary schooling attainment, the gap between male and female
primary schooling, urbanization rate, population and an oil dummy. We also add interstate and extra-
state wars (see Data Appendix) to Barro’s conditioning set. Our objective in the choice of explanatory
6 Note that we used the POLITY2 measure, which transforms the Polity “standardized authority codes” (i.e., -66, -77,
and -88) to scaled POLITY scores so the POLITY scores may be used consistently in time-series analyses without losing
crucial information by treating the “standardized authority scores” as missing values. Adding a time trend to (1) does not
aﬀect the results.
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variables is to capture shocks to the political system that are unrelated to the degree of development,
to human capital attainment, to external wars, and to control for the inertia inherent in changing the
political system. We interpret the volatility of the residual ∈it(the unexplained component) defined asp
vari (it) as a quantitative measure of political instability.7 Our measure captures fluctuations in the
degree of democracy and encapsulates movements towards democracy as well as towards dictatorship.
In this it is related to that Tornell’s (1998) measure of political crises (a 3 point shift in the Polity score).
However, Tornell (1998) measures only drastic political change while ours captures incremental shifts as
well.
The first question we face is the number of autoregressive terms to include in (1). We examined
various univariate specifications where we estimated how Polity in country i at time t depends on its
lagged values. GMM estimates suggest that three lags of the dependent variable should be included
in (1). The second is the choice of estimation techniques for (1). We experimented with five estima-
tion techniques: a country-by-country OLS estimator, the Arellano-Bond system GMM technique, the
Arellano-Bond diﬀerence GMM technique, the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (which is a special case of the
Arellano-Bond diﬀerence estimator), and a simple fixed-eﬀects estimator with country specific dummies.
If poolability of coeﬃcients is a concern, then the OLS specification is more general in that it allows the
estimated coeﬃcients in (1) to vary across countries while the other specifications constraint them to be
the same. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables results in parame-
ter estimates that are biased and inconsistent. Diﬀerent estimation techniques deal with this source of
inconsistency in diﬀerent ways. For the system-GMM, diﬀerence-GMM and Anderson-Hsiao techniques,
appropriately lagged levels of Polity serve as instruments for the lagged dependent variables. However,
a drawback of this approach to estimation is the problem of weak instruments (see Hauk and Wacziarg,
2004 for a discussion) arising in small samples (small N): the first stage relationship between diﬀerenced
independent variables and lagged level variables may be weak, biasing the GMM estimates. This may
be of concern since we have data on only 98 countries for at least 20 years.8 Therefore, we also use a
7 In response to expected shocks to the country’s Polity (that arise from a recession or an external war,) the leadership
can adjust by relying on various measures such as jailing dissidents, cracking down on demonstrators, or even broadening
the governing coalition. These movements in the Polity score may not be aﬀected by inequality nor reflected in policy and
output volatility.
8 Moreover, Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) find using Monte Carlo simulations that even with a sample size of N = 1000
GMM estimates may be biased in the presence of measurement error.
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fixed-eﬀects estimator with autoregressive terms. Recent studies suggest that for this estimator, the bias
sharply decays if T exceeds 20 or 30 periods (Bond, 2002), which is the case here. While the diﬀerence
estimator is asymptotically consistent, it has low asymptotic precision and large biases in small samples,
which leads to the need to complement it with the regression equation in levels. This gives the system
GMM estimator, that joins in a single system the regression equation in diﬀerences and in levels, each
with its specific set of instrumental variables. We also control for the joint endogeneity of per capita
GDP and POLITY - a critical issue in the literature on political instability and growth - by instrument-
ing per-capita GDP with lagged GDP growth.9 Finally, all approaches can control for unobserved and
time-invariant country-specific eﬀects.
Table 1 presents the results for the fixed-eﬀects, the system-GMM, the diﬀerence-GMM and the
Anderson-Hsiao techniques. Table 2.1 presents our country-by-country OLS based measure of political
instability, where countries are ranked in increasing order of political instability. As the ranking shows,
what our measure captures is not whether a country has a high or low POLITY score (i.e., whether it is
a democracy or a dictatorship) but that whether it is a stable democracy (e.g., US, Canada, UK) or a
stable dictatorship (e.g., Syria, China), all of which have a low index of political instability. Moreover, it
captures both transitions to and from dictatorial regimes and not simply adverse regime changes. Table
2.2 shows the pairwise correlations between the various measures of political instability - in all cases
the correlation exceeds 0.66. We will present results based on the country-by-country OLS estimator,
the fixed-eﬀects estimator and the system-GMM estimator. These measures are henceforth termed the
PIOLS , the PIFE and PIGMM measures of political instability.10
3.1 Comparing Measures of Political Instability
First, we regress our OLS measure of political instability on various components that prior researchers
have combined to form their measures of political instability (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996).11 These
include successful and unsuccessful coups, riots and political assassinations. We do not have data on
9 Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) show that newly democratized countries experience a significant increase in economic
growth controlling for other types of regime changes. See also Acemoglu et al (2005).
10 Charts, summary statistics and additional results using the other estimators, are available at
http://faculty.insead.edu/dutt/instability
11 Note that our measure of political instability enters all our regressions in natural logarithms.
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popular revolutions aimed at restoring democracy.12 As the regression (standard errors in parentheses,
*/**/*** represent significance at the 10%/5%/1% levels in this and subsequent regressions) below shows












R2 = 0.23, N = 94
Next we consider how our measure compares to the direct approach based on Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2004) who count the number of times the Polity score transited from positive to negative
and vice versa.14 22 countries (a majority of the OECD countries) receive a score of zero on both the
direct measure and on PIOLS . However, by the direct measure an additional 30 countries (53% in all)
receive a score of 0 - these are countries that experienced changes in the Polity score but did not cross
the zero threshold. In contrast, only 22% receive a value of zero for PIOLS . A few examples can help
highlight the diﬀerence between the two measures. By the direct measure, countries like US, UK and
Canada, receive a score of zero as do countries like Algeria and South Africa. South Africa had a Polity
score of 4 during the Apartheid era which increased to 9 by 1994. The post-Apartheid era witnessed
a revolutionary change in political participation, but this change is not picked up by the direct count
measure. The same is the case for countries like India, Sri Lanka, and China, all of whom receive a zero
score by the direct measure but owing to fluctuations in the Polity score that do not cross the 0 threshold
receive a strictly positive score by the PIOLS measure. Similarly, Algeria fluctuates between extremely
and moderately autocratic governments (the Polity score fluctuates between -9 and -2) which again the
direct count measure would ignore. In contrast, Algeria is ranked as relatively unstable by PIOLS . Spain
and Zambia transited just once from dictatorship to democracy and would have identical ranks by the
direct measure. However, while the former moved from a stable dictatorship (score of -9) to a stable
democracy (score of 9), Zambia’s commitment to political reform faded within 5 years of introducing
12 The variable ‘Revolutions’ from Banks does not capture this concept. It is defined as any illegal or forced change in
the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from the central government. Clearly the scope of this variable is much broader than popular revolutions
aimed at introducing democracy.
13 Similar results obtain if we run this regression for each decade separately.
14 We also constructed a direct count measure based on the Gastil 7 point political rights measure. We counted the
number of times this measure moved from ‘Not Free’ to ‘Free or Partially Free’ or vice versa over the period 1960-2000.
The results are nearly identical to the one based on transitions in the Polity score between positive and negative values.
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multi-party elections in 1991 (despite this Zambia’s Polity score remained positive). The PIOLS yields
a more reasonable ranking. The two measures agree on countries that are extremely politically unstable
such as Haiti, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand. To summarize, while both measures agree on countries
that are either very politically unstable or very politically stable, the direct measure fails to capture
incremental changes in the Polity score and fails to distinguish between major and minor changes in
political rights.
We also attempt to pin down the exact diﬀerences between the Alesina-Perotti measure of sociopoliti-
cal instability (SPI), based on principal component analysis, and PIOLS .15 The Alesina-Perotti concept
of political instability is broader than the ones we construct. While Alesina and Perotti would classify any
society with frequent coups, deaths from mass violence, political assassinations and all other kinds social
unrest that lead to changes in governments as politically unstable, our measure is about the fluctuations
in the degree of democracy. In other words, a coup that leads to the replacement of a dictator by another
equally autocratic dictator will add to political instability according to the Alesina-Perotti measure but
not according to ours. On the other hand a coup that replaces a democracy with dictatorship will add to
political volatility measured under both methods.16 The same is true about the movement in the reverse
direction from dictatorship to democracy. To show this, we regress their measure on ours. The R2 from
this regression is 0.41, meaning that fluctuations in and out of democratic regimes account for only 41%
of the variation in the SPI measure. Two countries, perhaps best capture the diﬀerence between the
PIOLS and SPI measure - Great Britain and Italy. Both are ranked as relatively stable by our measure
(tied at 1st) by our measure but relatively unstable by the Alesina-Perotti measure (24th and 23rd re-
spectively). It does not seem very reasonable that Great Britain and Italy are similar to Colombia and
Mexico (ranked 25th and 26rd respectively by SPI) in terms of political instability. The reason why the
SPI measure categorizes Britain as relatively politically unstable is because the SPI measure includes
deaths in mass political violence and Britain experienced racial riots over a period of three months in
1981. Similarly, Italy experienced political assassinations carried out by the Red Brigade in 1978 which
15 We choose the Alesina Perotti measure for two reasons: it was the first to construct a weighted measure of various
events that impact sociopolitical stability and second it is the most widely cited.
16 However, we do acknowledge that distinguishing types of political instability based on the outcome of riots, demon-
stration, purges etc. is far from ideal.
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is picked up by the SPI measure. However, both these phenomena were short-lived and had no aﬀect
on the degree of democracy (both countries get a maximum Polity score of 10 throughout the period
of study), and accordingly neither of these countries are classified as unstable by our measure. In fact,
neither countries experienced significant changes in either inequality (a driver of political instability) or
in policies, investment and economic growth (that are hypothesized as aﬀected by political instability).
Another example where the two measures diﬀer substantially is the case of Togo - ranked 51st by the
SPI measure but only 39th by our measure. Etienne Eyadema has ruled the country with an iron fist
since 1967. During this time, the country experienced various coup attempts all of which failed, as well
as riots carried out by pro-democracy activists that were brutally suppressed. These would contribute
to the SPI measure of political instability but not to our measure - the POLITY score of Togo has
remained at −7 for most of the period till 1992.
4 Determinants of Political Instability
We draw on Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001a) theory of political transition to analyze the relationship
between inequality and our measures of political instability. As explained in the theory section, their
model predicts that a highly unequal society is likely to fluctuate in and out of democracy. Muller and
Seligson (1987) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) have previously documented the correlation between
inequality and political instability. We measure inequality as the Gini coeﬃcient and inversely as the
percentage share of the median quintile in total income- Q3.Data on inequality are obtained from Dollar
and Kraay (2000) and the World Bank.
To demonstrate the robustness of the relationship between inequality and our measure of political
instability, we control for a variety of factors - natural resources, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and
for colonial and regional eﬀects. Many of the poorest developing countries have significant natural
resources but all too often this income is misappropriated by powerful elites. This in turn fuels internal
grievances that cause conflict and political instability. This pattern is widely referred to as the “natural
resource curse” - natural resource wealth creates stagnation and conflict, rather than economic growth
and development. We used the measure recently made available by the World Bank (1997) where
share of natural capital in total capital (which comprises physical, human and natural capital) has been
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constructed for a single year, 1994. Next, it may be argued that a fractionalized population leads to
multiple elite groups and competition amongst these groups for political power, some forms of which may
reduce stability of political regimes, whether democratic or dictatorial. Therefore, we use the index of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization from Easterly and Levine (1997) as an additional explanatory variable.
We also control for regional disparities in political instability by using a variety of regional dummies,
and add a dummy variable that captures whether the country was a British Colony after 1918.
Table 3 looks at the relationship between political instability and inequality once all the controls are
included, where three measures of political instability are regressed on three measures of inequality -
the Gini coeﬃcient from Dollar-Kraay, the high quality Gini from Deininger-Squire and Q3.17 From the
three OLS estimates, we see that inequality (Dollar-Kraay measure) significantly exacerbates political
instability supporting the Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) assertion. This is true for two out of three of
the instability measures.18 We also find that natural resource rich countries are also the ones that are
politically unstable. There is some evidence that fractionalization of the population matters and that
countries that were formerly British colonies are more stable. All three models as a whole are significant
and our variables account for more than 28-40% of the cross-country variation in political instability.
One of the issues that the literature has grappled with is the direction of causality between politi-
cal instability and income inequality. Countries with stable political regimes and where democracy is
consolidated will adopt more egalitarian policies which over time may have redistributive consequences.
Since our inequality measure is averaged over time, this may be a concern. As a first step, we restricted
our sample to only those countries for whom inequality data are available prior to 1980. For this sample
and with Gini coeﬃcients prior to 1980 we were able to replicate our results. However, our sample size
declines to 59 countries following this restriction. To control for any other endogeneity biases as well
as measurement error in the inequality variables, we also instrument inequality with land Gini from Li,
Squire and Zou (1998) and schooling Gini from Castellóa and Rafael Doménech (2002) based on Barro
17 We also used the WIDER measure of inequality from the World Bank and wage—inequality data from
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html. While both measures significantly impact political instability, with the wage-
inequality measure, our results are weaker in terms of model significance. Also see Lübker, Smith and Weeks (2002)
for a critique of the Dollar-Kraay measure.
18 Note that Q3 is an inverse measure of inequality so we would expect the sign to be opposite of the one obtained in
the regression with the Gini coeﬃcient. The OLS estimates for Deininger-Squire Gini coeﬃcient and Q3 - not presented
here - are highly significant as well.
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and Lee’s measure of average schooling attainment.19 From the IV estimates in the last six columns
of table 3, we can see that the coeﬃcient on inequality increases in both magnitude and significance.
Hansen-Sargan tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of overidentifying restrictions confirming the valid-
ity of our instruments. In sum, we conclude that there is a robust relationship between income inequality
and political instability, and our tests indicate that the causal links are from inequality to political insta-
bility. In terms of the economic significance of income inequality for political instability, a one standard
deviation reduction in inequality in say Congo (ranked 85nd in table 2.1) results a reduction in PIOLS
equivalent to less that of Mexico (rank 46th), which points to the critical role played by income inequality
in aﬀecting political instability.
4.1 Comparing Measures of Political Instability










∗∗∗Gini; R2 = 0.11, N = 85
where Gini is the Gini coeﬃcient. Notice that inequality has a p-value of less than 0.1% for our measure
and a p-value of 7.5% for the SPI measure. Moreover, inequality accounts for twice the amount of
variation for our measure as compared to the SPI measure.20














Gini; R2 = 0.41;N = 58
Clearly when SPI is regressed on PI and Gini, the Gini coeﬃcient is not significant (and even has the
wrong sign). This means that inequality aﬀects the Alesina-Perotti measure of political instability only
19 Both land and schooling inequality should be related to income inequality and not directly related to polity instability
(other than through its eﬀect on income inequality). We test this assumption by using a Hansen-Sargan test of overiden-
tifying restrictions - if our instruments are important also in the determination of political instability directly, then the
test would have rejected the orthogonality of the errors and the instruments. The p-value of the overidentification test
is reported in the last row of table 3. Table 3 also reports a test for excluded instruments and the partial R2 from the
first-stage regression. The first stage regressions are available from the authors on request.
20 If we restrict the sample in both regressions to exactly the same set of countries, we observe nearly identical results.
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through our measure and not independently of it. On the other hand, there are eﬀects of inequality
on our measure that have two components, one correlated with Alesina-Perotti measure and the other
uncorrelated with it. The last two regressions very clearly illustrate the tighter link of our measure of
political instability (as opposed to the Alesina-Perotti one) with the Acemoglu-Robinson theory. This
finding is robust to the inclusion of controls mentioned before. Thus, the channel through which inequality
aﬀects political instability appears to be the one described by Acemoglu and Robinson.
As a further robustness check, we attempted to capture the components of sociopolitical instability
that does not result in changes in the Polity score. To do this we used principal component analysis to
construct a weighted average of political assassinations, worker strike, purges, riots and anti-government
demonstrations. We then performed a country-by-country IV regression where we regressed this variable
on Polity and instrumented Polity with its lagged value. The residuals from this regression should capture
the components mentioned above which is orthogonal to Polity. We calculated the standard error of this
residual in order to compare it to PIOLS . None of the measures of inequality significantly aﬀects this
measure.21
Next, in table 4 we analyze the eﬀect of inequality on the various components of political instability
and on the direct count measure of transitions. The first two columns reveal an insignificant relationship
between the two count measures of political transitions (one based on Polity and the other on Gastil).
This is not surprising given the coarseness of these measures.22 Next we look at the relationship be-
tween other components of political instability namely, political assassinations, riots in general, riots in
democracies, unsuccessful coups, and coups in dictatorships. These need not result in a change in the
political regime (the first four) and/or in the Polity score (coups in dictatorships). While it is important
to recognize that political assassinations and riots may have non-economic roots such as race (as in the
US), religion (as in Bangladesh), political ideology (as in France or Italy) and caste (as in India), it is
plausible that income inequality also exercises an influence. However, as the columns 3-5 of table 4 show,
we fail to find evidence for a significant relationship with inequality. Similarly, income inequality does
21 The correlation between this measure and PIOLS is only 0.2. Moreover, this measure does not impact either fiscal
or trade policy volatility. In fact, if we regress fiscal or trade policy volatility simultaneously on PIOLS and this measure,
then the former has the wrong sign and insignificant while PIOLS is positive and significant.
22 We also constructed direct count measures by dividing the Polity and Gastil scales into three parts. The results and
comparisons remain unchanged.
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not seem to positively influence the number of failed coups or coups in dictatorships.
5 Consequences of Political Instability
The analysis of the consequences of sociopolitical instability has been a central theme in the economic
growth literature. (See Barro, 1991; Blomberg, 1996; Alesina et al, 1996.) Widely accepted as a stylized
fact is that political instability adversely aﬀects investment in an economy by increasing uncertainty
and undermining the incentives for capital accumulation. First, when there is a significant risk of
regime change, future economic policy becomes a lot more uncertain. Second, anticipating a regime
change, policies may be abruptly adjusted to circumvent regime change. Theoretically, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001a) draw attention to this second point: in their paper, in a dictatorship (semi-consolidated
democracy) the government may adopt policies closer (farther from) to the median voter in order to
avert revolutions (coups). Given this aspect and given that diﬀerent types of redistributive policies
will emerge in equilibrium in democracies and dictatorships (or depending on the degree of democracy
or dictatorship), political instability in terms of the movement in and out of democracy will lead to
volatility in redistributive policies. Thus, policy volatility is likely to be positively associated with
political instability. As a result, investors may postpone projects and/or opt for capital flight in more
extreme cases. While this link between policy volatility and political instability has been emphasized
earlier, there have been no attempts to explore a direct link between the two. Instead a reduced-form
approach has been adopted (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Campos and Nugent, 2002) where the
relationship between capital investment and political instability has been analyzed. In this paper, we
will try and explore the existence of such a direct link, and only subsequently introduce notions of
investment and economic growth.
5.1 Measuring Policy Volatility: Trade and Fiscal Policies
We will focus on two key components of governmental policy: fiscal policy and trade policy. We believe
both to have profound implications for growth and distribution, and are subject to manipulation by
political groups, lobbies and sundry interest groups. In measuring fiscal policy volatility, we follow Fatas
and Mihov (2003) who study the eﬀects of volatility in discretionary fiscal policy on economic growth.
They define discretionary fiscal policy as changes in fiscal policy that are not in response to current
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macroeconomic conditions. We measure fiscal policy as government final consumption expenditure as a
percentage of GDP. We estimate the following regression for 92 countries:
Git = αi + βiGit−1 + γiYit + δiXit + uit
where G is the logarithm of government spending (as a proportion of GDP), Y is the logarithm of real
GDP, and X is a vector of control variables that include inflation, inflation squared, and an an index of
oil prices. Again we run a country-by-country OLS regression which controls for country-specific eﬀects,
instrumenting GDP with two lags of GDP growth. Following Fatas and Mihov, we calculate the volatility
of discretionary fiscal policy (as measured by government spending) as
p
vari(uit) which we will denote
as σGi .
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Measuring trade policy volatility is more complicated. Few direct measures of trade policy exist that
are comparable across countries and over time, and countries have recourse to a wide variety of direct
and indirect trade policies (tariﬀs, quotas, VERs, subsidies to name a few). To measure trade policy






measures be adjusted for country size, population and transport costs to provide
a more accurate picture of trade protection. In addition, we use a direct measure of trade policy as well:
import duties as a percentage of total imports. We adjust these measures for lagged dependence since
changes in trade policies are relatively infrequent, the country’s level of development and an index of oil
prices. We also add a remoteness index (a weighted average of a country’s trading partners’ GDP where
the weights are distance to the trading partners) to capture trading costs.24 For the two measures of
trade policy, we run the regression25
TPit = αi + βiTPit−1 + γiYit + δiXit + vit
using the country-by-country OLS regression and measure trade policy volatility as
p
vari(vit)which we
23 We have experimented with various permutations in measuring policy volatility. These include: an Anderson-Hsiao
estimator, a fixed eﬀects estimator, and the Arellano-Bond system GMM estimators. In all cases the volatility measures
are highly correlated with the country-by-country OLS based measure.





confounds policies with outcomes. However,
our country-by-country OLS specification will rid us of many country-specific time invariant terms such as colonial and
linguistic ties that aﬀect trade volumes.





but measure import duties in levels since many countries report zero
import duties, especially in the 1990s. Trade policy volatility based on import duty is computed using the Anderson-Hsiao
technique because many countries have limited data on import duty.
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and import duties are highly
correlated with one another (rank correlation of 0.64). Table 5 shows our measures of policy volatility
for the government spending based measure of fiscal volatility and the openness based measure of trade
volatility. The countries have been ranked in terms of ascending order of fiscal policy volatility.
5.2 The Eﬀect of Political Instability on Policy Volatility
Table 6 shows the relationship between political instability and fiscal policy volatility, while table 7
does the same for trade policy volatility. We report both OLS and IV regression results for three
measures of political instability (PIOLS , PIFE and PIGMM ). In our IV estimates (to control for
possible endogeneity or measurement error), we use as instruments the Gini coeﬃcient, natural capital
share and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which were shown in the previous section to significantly
influence political instability. The Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions in the last row
of tables 6 and 7 confirm the validity of our instruments. In addition, we control for the following
factors: in table 6 we include trade exposure, since open economies are more prone to external shocks,
governments may have to resort to discretionary fiscal policy to smooth these shocks (see Rodrik, 1998);
domestic distortions, since these distortions may necessitate more frequent changes in discretionary fiscal
policy; and various political and institutional determinants of discretionary fiscal policy (see Persson and
Tabellini, 2000 for a summary). Domestic distortions are measured by calculating for each country the
PPP value of the investment deflator in 1960 (relative to the US) and then calculating the deviation from
the sample mean of this deflator. Political and institutional variables include the number of elections
(both Presidential and Parliamentary) and a dummy for Presidential systems (see Fatas and Mihov,
2003). We control for regional eﬀects by adding a set of regional dummies.26 In table 7 the additional
explanatory variables include regional dummies, the same political institution characteristics, and the
year the country joined the GATT/WTO.27
From table 6, we can see that political instability is significant across measures of policy volatility and
26 In addition, we tried the following set of controls: constraints on the decision-making of the chief executive; majoritarian
vs. proportional systems of democracy; percentage of years when left-wing governments were in power over the time period
of the study; fractionalization of opposition parties. None of these political determinants seem to play a significant role in
aﬀecting policy volatility.
27 For countries who are not members of the GATT/WTO we set the year of accession to 2006. According to the WTO
website, one of the ways for countries to demonstrate their commitment to trade policy stability is via membership in the
WTO. Rose (2004) examines this hypothesis in a recent paper but finds very little support for it.
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political instability and when we control for endogeneity bias and/or measurement error by instrumenting
political instability. A one standard deviation reduction in political instability (Polity measure) would
reduce fiscal policy volatility (the government expenditure measure) in Argentina (ranked 89th) to that
of Chile (ranked 62nd). In terms of our controls, there is some evidence that domestic distortions induce
greater policy volatility.
In table 7, we see that political instability is also a consistent and significant predictor of trade policy
volatility - across measures of trade policy and across measures of political instability. These results are
also robust to instrumenting for political instability using inequality. In terms of the magnitude of eﬀects,
a one standard deviation reduction in political instability, based on our IV estimates, would reduce trade
policy volatility of Nigeria (ranked 67th) to that of Hong Kong (rank 31st). We also find that while
Presidential systems do not exhibit significant diﬀerences in the volatility of trade policies, the number
of elections seems to reduce trade volatility. We also find evidence that the later a country becomes part
of the GATT/WTO the greater is its trade policy volatility. This surely warrants further investigation
given the way trade policy volatility is constructed in this paper diﬀers from that used by Rose (2004)
who uses a coeﬃcient of variation measure.
5.3 Comparing Measures of Political Instability
We again make an attempt to evaluate the relative explanatory power of the Alesina-Perotti measure








SPI; N = 57; R2 = 0.44
which shows that it is political instability as captured by transitions between democratic and dictatorial
political regimes that leads to fiscal policy volatility. This result is also robust to the addition of controls.
When PI is dropped from the above regression, SPI becomes significant, while on the other hand if
SPI is dropped instead, PI remains significant. In fact, if we drop SPI from this regression, then we
observe an insignificant change in the coeﬃcient on PI - from 0.21 to 0.25. When we perform a similar







SPI; N = 57; R2 = 0.38
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where again our measure seems to be the key driver of trade policy volatility - a result robust across
measures of trade policy volatility and to the use of controls. Thus, even though the broad measure
(Alesina-Perotti) aﬀects policy volatility, it does so only through the Acemoglu-Robinson channel that
our measure captures.
Next, in table 8 we regress fiscal and trade policy volatility on our alternative measures of political
instability - the direct transition count measure, political assassinations, riots, riots in democracies,
unsuccessful coups and coups in dictatorships. Only the direct transition count measure significantly
impacts both types of policy volatility - the rest are insignificant and even have the wrong sign. It seems
plausible that riots, assassinations, failed coups and coups in dictatorships often do not aﬀect the Polity
score and therefore do not mark a fundamental shift in the way the Polity arrives at policy decisions.
Therefore these do not lead to a volatility in trade and fiscal policies.28 Comparing the eﬀects of our
measure of political instability with the direct transition measure we find that a one standard deviation
in the former increases policy volatility by a magnitude that is more than 2.5 that for the latter.
To summarize, we find strong empirical evidence that political instability as captured by transitions
between democracies and dictatorships, engenders significant policy volatility and creates an uncertain
policy environment. We also find evidence that income inequality indirectly leads to policy uncertainty
(which is what our IV regressions say where inequality is an instrument for political instability).29 It
leads to fluctuations in the degree of democracy, which in turn creates policy volatility as regime turnover
results in new policies. This is the mechanism that Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) have documented
in their study of the consolidation of democracy.
28 To check the plausibility of this statement, we added riots, strikes by workers and political assassinations in our first
stage regression of Polity on its lagged values and the conditioning set of Barro. Only strikes are significant but they
enter with a positive sign, i.e., countries that experience more strikes are in fact more likely to democratize. We ran these
regressions with various specifications (fixed eﬀects, GMM, Anderson-Hsiao) as well as separately by decade — we find no
evidence that either of these negatively and significantly aﬀect the Polity score. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) also argue
that incumbent political regimes find it diﬃcult to commit to policy changes.
29 We also evaluated the robustness of this proposed link as hypothesized by Acemoglu and Robinson by performing
the following test: we regressed political instability on income inequality and generated both predicted values as well as
residuals. We used both these variables in lieu of political instability in the policy volatility regressions. We find the
predicted values (as well as the residuals) to be highly significant and of substantial magnitude, which indicates that the
component of political instability, explained by income inequality, significantly influences policy volatility.
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6 Political Instability, Policy Volatility and Economic Outcomes
Now that we have demonstrated a robust link between political instability and policy volatility the
question that naturally arises is: what are the adverse consequences, if any, of policy volatility? Here
we examine how policy volatility (and political instability) aﬀects output volatility and second, how
policy and output volatility aﬀects investment. It is well known that investment and output stability are
positively associated with economic growth. Levine and Renelt (1992) used Leamer’s extreme bounds
analysis to show that the share of investment in GDP is one of the few variables that is robustly correlated
with economic growth. Similarly, Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Fatas and Mihov (2003), demonstrate
that countries with higher output volatility experience lower economic growth.30 While we were able to
replicate the growth results in the context of our paper, we do not present detailed results due to space
constraints.
6.1 Output Volatility
We follow Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Fatas and Mihov (2003) and measure output volatility as the
standard deviation of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita for each of the countries in our sample.
We estimate the following model:








+ δZi + υi
where σGi and σ
TP
i are defined as before. Following Acemoglu et al (2003) the vector Z includes the
following policy variables: inflation, exchange rate overvaluation, government consumption expenditure,
openness (measured as X+MGDP since greater openness may expose the country to more external shocks),
and volatility in the country’s terms of trade.
We first ran the following simple regression:




∗∗∗PIOLS ; N = 80, R2 = 0.21 (2)
which indicates that political instability is positively related to output volatility. In Table 9, we present
our detailed results on how output volatility depends on policy volatility and political instability: Both
30 In the standard neoclassical growth model, policy uncertainty does not play any role in determining the long-run
growth rate of per capita output and policy shocks displace the economy only temporarily from its original growth path.
In contrast, models of endogenous growth suggest that policies and policy volatility can have permanent eﬀects on growth
(see Aizenman and Marion, 1999 and King et al 1988 as examples).
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our OLS and IV results show that fiscal policy volatility and trade policy volatility, when entered sep-
arately, positively aﬀect output volatility. The volatility measures remain significant even when the
controls are dropped. In our IV regressions, we control for the endogeneity of fiscal and trade policy
volatility using the following instruments: political instability (Polity measure), electoral system, the
number of elections, domestic distortions and date of GATT/WTO membership. For our IV regressions,
the coeﬃcient estimates show that a 1% decline in fiscal (trade) policy volatility reduces output volatility
by 0.97%(0.74%). When both policy volatility measures are included, the OLS estimates show that both
significant at the 1% level. However, when entered together and instrumented, only trade policy volatility
is significant at 5%, due to strong multicollinearity.31 Among the controls, only openness is statistically
significant and enters with a positive sign. The significance and the positive sign of the political instabil-
ity variable in the simple regression (shown above) of output volatility on political instability, indicates
that political instability aﬀects output volatility. However, from table 9, it is clear that this aﬀect works
only through its eﬀect on policy volatility.32
Comparing the two measures of trade policy volatility (columns 3-6), fluctuations in trade exposure
have a proportionately bigger impact, in terms of magnitude, than do fluctuations in import duties. One
reason for this is that governments have access to a wide variety of trade policy instruments (quotas,
export subsidies, VERs etc.) that would show up in greater volatility of the trade exposure measure.
Governments who have committed to tariﬀ levels in international agreements also implicitly protect
sectors through domestic policies that act as substitutes for import protection (Bagwell and Staiger,
2006). Standard trade policy measures like import duties would fail to capture these aspects but they
would be encapsulated in the trade exposure based measure.
31 The R2 obtained from regressing the predicted value (from the first stage of the 2SLS regressions) of one on that of
the other is 0.97 which indicates very high collinearity.
32 When political instability is added as a regressor, it turns out to be statistically insignificant. We also substituted
the measure of political instability with the Polity measure itself as a composite indicator for political and democratic
institutions. Our results remain unchanged - Polity has an independent eﬀect on output volatility and the policy volatility
measures remain strongly significant. This result contrasts sharply with that of Acemoglu et al (2003) who find that
political institutions and not macroeconomic policies are the main driver of output volatility. However, they focus on
policies rather than on policy volatility, which we find to be a critical driver of output volatility.
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6.2 Investment and Growth
Volatility, whether of policies or output, may play a role in deterring investment. When investments
are irreversible, volatility of output and policies exacerbate uncertainty about the future and investors
may adopt a "wait-and watch" attitude since there is an option value to waiting for information to
arrive. We find that both trade and fiscal policy volatility adversely aﬀect investment, controlling for
other determinants of investment spending; these include schooling (measured by the percentage of
population above 25 with primary education,) domestic distortions, openness and regional dummies.
This eﬀect is also robust to instrumenting the policy volatility variables with three measures of political
institutions - political instability, the number of elections and a dummy for Presidential systems. The
presence of political instability as an instrument for policy instability, indicates that political instability
lowers investment, and that it does so by exacerbating volatility of trade and fiscal policies. Second,
instrumenting output volatility with the two policy volatility variables, we find that output volatility
significantly and adversely aﬀects investment spending. Third, 3SLS estimates, where we also instrument
the policy volatility measures using political instability suggest that political instability increases policy
volatility which in turn, raises the volatility of output and that this acts as a significant deterrent to
investment spending. Finally we regress economic growth on output volatility, investment spending,
initial human capital and initial per capita GDP. The coeﬃcient of output volatility turns out to have a
negative sign and is significant, while that of investment spending is positive and significant.
7 Robustness Across Decades
The relationships we have identified so far are for data on diﬀerent kinds of volatility or instability
calculated over four decades, and therefore these relationships certainly hold in the long run. To confirm
their validity in the short run, we run these regressions for each of these four decades separately. Table 10
shows that the relationship between political instability and inequality as fairly robust across decades. It
holds for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s separately for which inequality has a positive and significant impact
on political instability, while the eﬀect is statistically insignificant for the 1960s. The coeﬃcient of political
instability, when either fiscal or trade policy volatility is regressed on it, is positive and significant for
each of these four decades. When we pool data across decades, the results with country-specific fixed
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and random eﬀects have the right signs for all three regressions, and are statistically significant in all
cases except for the fixed eﬀects model of political instability regressed on inequality.
8 Conclusion
This paper uses a new methodology to construct measures of political instability that capture movements
only from dictatorship to democracy and vice versa but do not capture government changes that preserve
the democratic or dictatorial structure of the country. We show that unequal societies move in and out
of democracy, i.e., fluctuate between being democratic and dictatorial. Our empirical work clearly
shows that inequality is positively correlated with our measures of political instability as well as with
more traditional measures (e.g., Alesina and Perotti,) but the impact of inequality on the latter is only
through components of political instability as captured in our measures. Moreover, our residual based
measures of political instability perform better than a direct count measure in terms of ranking countries
and are more closely linked to income inequality. We also find evidence that volatility of a broad set of
trade and fiscal policies is increasing in fluctuations in the degree of democracy. Further, we find that
the Alesina-Perotti measure of political instability (that is broader and captures additional aspects of
political instability) aﬀects policy volatility only through the components of instability captured by our
measures.
We next find that output volatility is aﬀected by political instability but only through its eﬀect
on policy volatility. We find strong evidence of a channel that starts from inequality which then aﬀects
political instability which in turn aﬀects policy volatility and then output volatility. Further, we find that
policy volatility adversely aﬀects investment, through its eﬀect on output volatility. Output volatility
and investment significantly impact economic growth. We therefore, are able to trace out an alternative
link between political instability and economic growth - one that operates through policy and output
volatility.
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Data Series Used for the Construction of Political Instability and Policy Volatility 
Polity score 
 (1960-2000) 
Polity data adjusted for standardized scores(Polity 2 in database) from IV Project, Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College 
Park. (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2000) 
Real GDP per capita  
(1960-2000) 




Average years of primary schooling attained in population above 25. From Barro & Lee 
(2000) 
Gender gap in schooling 
(1960-2000) 
Gap between male and female primary schooling attainment. From Barro & Lee (2000) 
Population 
(1960-2000) 
Country’s population from World Development Indicators (2002). 
Urbanization 
(1960-2000) 
Percentage of population residing in urban areas from World Development Indicators (2002). 
Oil dummy Dummy =1 if country classified as oil-exporter by IMF. 
Inter-State Wars  
(1960-1999) 
Wars in which a nation that qualifies as a member of the interstate system engages in a war 
with another member of the interstate system. To qualify as a state member of the interstate 
system an entity must have a minimum population of 500,000 and either membership in the 
League of Nations or United Nations or diplomatic recognition from any two major powers. 
From Armed Conflict Dataset, NRIO. 
Extra-State Wars  
(1960-1999) 
Includes two types of wars. First, imperial war, involves an adversary that is an independent 
political entity but does not qualify as a member of the interstate system. Second, colonial 
war, includes international wars in which the adversary was a colony, dependency or 
protectorate composed of ethnically different people and located at some geographical 
distance or, at least, peripheral to the center of government of the given system member. 
From Armed Conflict Dataset, NRIO. 
Index of oil prices  
(1960-1999) 
Logarithm of Petroleum spot price from International Financial Statistics, December 2002. 
Inflation 
 (1960-1999) 
The difference in the logarithm of the GDP deflator from WDI, 2002. 
Growth Rate of real GDP 
 (1960-1999) 




General government final consumption expenditure includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). 
Includes most expenditure on national defense and security, but not those that are part of 
government capital formation. Data are from WDI, 2002. 
Trade exposure  
(1960-2000) 
The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. Data from WDI, 2002. 
Import duties 
 (1960-1999) 
Import duties as a fraction of total imports. Data from WDI, 2002. 
Remoteness index 
(1960-1999) 
Weighted average of each country's trading partners' GDP where the weights are distance to 
the trading partners. From Andrew Rose’s website. 
 
Note: For the decadal results in table 10 we used the same variables, but reran all the regressions separately 
by decade. 
 
Data Series used in the Cross-Sectional Regressions  
(all measures are averaged over 1960-2000 unless otherwise mentioned) 
Gini Gini coefficients from Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Deininger Squire. Data for the latter 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/inequality/data.htm  
Q3 Share of the median quintile in income. 
Natural capital share 
(1994) 
The sum of the stock value of agricultural land, pasture land, timber, non-timber forest 
benefits, oil, coal, natural gas, metals, minerals and ores. From World Bank. 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization (1960) 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1960. Measures probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group. From Easterly 
and Levine, 1996. 
British colony Dummy variable which equals one if country was a British colony. Data are from Hall and 
Jones, 1999. 
Land inequality Land Gini from Li, Squire and Zou (1998) 
Schooling inequality 
(1960) 
Schooling Gini for the population aged 15 years and over from Castellóa and Rafael 
Doménech (2002) 
Openness Logarithm of the sum of imports and exports as % of GDP from WDI, 2002. 
Domestic distortions Measured by calculating for each country the PPP value of the investment deflator in 1960 
(relative to the US) and then calculating the deviation from the sample mean of this deflator. 
Presidential system Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for Presidential systems and 0 for proportional 
systems. Data from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), 2001 
Number of elections The average number of elections over the time period for which data are available. The series 
is constructed as the sum of legislative and executive elections from DPI, 2001 
Date of GATT/WTO 
accession 
Date country joined GATT/WTO. From Rose (2004). 
Schooling Secondary schooling of males over 25. From Barro and Lee (2000). 
Terms of trade volatility Standard deviation of country's terms of trade over the period 1960-2000. Data on terms of 
trade from International Financial Statistics, December 2002. 
Exchange rate 
overvaluation 
Overvaluation index from Dollar (1992) 
Investment Investment as a percentage of GDP. From Penn World Tables (version 6.1). 
Political transitions 
(Polity) 




Number of times Gastil political rights measure moved from `Not Free' to `Free or Partially 
Free' or vice versa over the period 1960-2000. 
Political assassinations Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government official or 
politician. From Arthur Banks. 
Riots Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical 
force. From Arthur Banks 
Successful coups The number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government elite and/or its 
effective control of the nation's power structure in a given year. From Arthur Banks. Note the 
Banks database does not include unsuccessful coups. 
Unsuccessful coups Number of unsuccessful coups, 1960-85, from Alesina et al, 1996. 
 
Table 1: First Stage Results
Fixed Effects GMM system GMM difference Anderson-Hsiao
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Polity(t-1) 0.976*** 0.841*** 0.329*** 1.052***
(0.017) (0.032) (0.076) (0.282)
Polity(t-2) -0.107*** -0.09*** -0.019 -0.099***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Polity(t-3) -0.009 -0.143*** -0.501*** -0.044
(0.017) (0.033) (0.107) (0.029)
years of primary schooling 0.136 0.769*** 6.893*** 0.819
(0.132) (0.28) (1.691) (2.771)
gender gap in primary schooling 0.267* -1.159 -13.413*** 0.592
(0.14) (0.734) (3.255) (0.736)
urbanization rate 0.026** -0.002 -0.403 -0.079
(0.01) (0.019) (0.326) (0.211)
log(population) 0.73** 0.284 5.307 -0.273
(0.303) (0.231) (6.142) (4.256)
oil dummy -0.818
(1.643)
log(per capita GDP) -0.105 0.258 -2.914 2.827
(0.134) (0.394) (3.085) (5.386)
extra-state wars -0.739** 0.989 5.912 -0.068
(0.43) (2.473) (9.899) (1.214)
inter-state wars -0.197 -1.667** 0.043 -0.227
(0.172) (0.714) (0.712) (0.262)
constant -7.36*** -5.519
(2.654) (3.54)
No. of observations 3450 3450 3350 3350
No. of countries 98 98 98 98
F-statistic 1463.27*** 195.21*** 14.66*** 5.0***
Specification tests (p-values)
(a) OID test 1 1 0.2
(b) Serial correlation
First order 0 0.003
Second order 0.46 0.862
Standard errors in parentheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
   Table 2.1: An Index of Political Instability (OLS Country-by-Country)
Australia 0 Venezuela 0.40 Benin 1.74
Austria 0 Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia) 0.41 Uganda 1.85
Belgium 0 Colombia 0.42 Brazil 1.91
Botswana 0 France 0.46 Korea, Rep. 1.93
Canada 0 Rwanda 0.50 Gambia, The 1.96
Switzerland 0 Togo 0.51 Sierra Leone 2.06
Costa Rica 0 Bahrain 0.57 Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.09
Germany 0 Cameroon 0.70 Dominican Republic 2.10
Denmark 0 Honduras 0.71 Ecuador 2.20
Finland 0 Spain 0.71 Fiji 2.22
United Kingdom 0 Tunisia 0.72 Central African Rep. 2.26
Ireland 0 Syrian Arab Republic 0.73 Bolivia 2.29
Iceland 0 Mexico 0.81 Philippines 2.32
Italy 0 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.84 Ghana 2.33
Japan 0 Jordan 0.93 Greece 2.36
Netherlands 0 Bangladesh 0.94 Chile 2.42
Norway 0 Liberia 0.95 Sudan 2.51
New Zealand 0 El Salvador 0.98 Niger 2.67
Papua New Guinea 0 Portugal 1.00 Congo, Rep. 2.78
Singapore 0 Hungary 1.01 Uruguay 2.91
Sweden 0 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.25 Panama 2.98
United States 0 Mali 1.39 Nepal 3.08
China 0 Paraguay 1.41 Thailand 3.10
Mauritius 0.17 Nicaragua 1.43 Turkey 3.12
Swaziland 0.18 Algeria 1.44 Peru 3.36
Jamaica 0.19 Malaysia 1.45 Malawi 3.75
Israel 0.21 Zimbabwe 1.49 Lesotho 4.16
Trinidad and Tobago 0.23 Kenya 1.51 Argentina 4.57
South Africa 0.34 Senegal 1.57 Zambia 4.63
India 0.34 Mozambique 1.57 Pakistan 4.85
Cyprus 0.36 Poland 1.61 Haiti 5.13
Iraq 0.39 Guatemala 1.66 Indonesia 5.49
Sri Lanka 0.39 Kuwait 1.73
    Table 2.2: Correlation Between Political Instability Measures
OLS Fixed Effects GMM-System GMM-Difference Anderson-Hsiao
OLS 1
Fixed Effects 0.92 1
GMM-System 0.87 0.90 1
GMM-Difference 0.66 0.66 0.69 1
Anderson-Hsiao 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.68 1
Table 3: Political Instability and Inequality
PI OLS PI FE PI GMM PI OLS PI FE PI GMM PI OLS PI FE PI GMM PI OLS PI FE PI GMM
inequality 0.037* 0.034* 0.011 0.211*** 0.148*** 0.101** 0.298** 0.208** 0.137** -0.657*** -0.471*** -0.293***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.069) (0.057) (0.042) (0.118) (0.084) (0.061) (0.152) (0.128) (0.095)
natural capital share 0.036** 0.033*** 0.021** 0.055** 0.051*** 0.037** -0.012 0.004 0.001 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.038***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.050) (0.035) (0.024) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012)
fractionalization 2.389*** 1.533** 1.270** 0.810 0.391 0.306 -0.834 -0.953 -0.349 -0.155 -0.323 -0.071
(0.809) (0.664) (0.527) (1.264) (1.018) (0.787) (1.773) (1.323) (1.013) (1.052) (0.881) (0.704)
British colony -0.259 -0.164 -0.185 -0.905 -0.736* -0.673* -1.310 -1.018 -0.898* -0.143 -0.201 -0.308
(0.426) (0.345) (0.287) (0.568) (0.427) (0.354) (0.935) (0.624) (0.478) (0.449) (0.335) (0.278)
Middle East & North Africa 2.343*** 1.578*** 1.096*** 1.887** 1.365* 0.928* -0.031 -0.103 -0.027 1.297** 0.934* 0.686
(0.460) (0.460) (0.413) (0.827) (0.705) (0.562) (1.363) (1.065) (0.801) (0.569) (0.512) (0.440)
East Asia 0.388 0.500 0.430 1.748*** 1.484*** 1.180*** 1.354* 1.148** 0.882** 0.962* 0.934*** 0.802***
(0.668) (0.487) (0.363) (0.660) (0.471) (0.369) (0.788) (0.541) (0.406) (0.557) (0.362) (0.283)
Latin America & Caribbean 1.453*** 1.122*** 0.778*** 0.062 0.229 0.069 -2.340 -1.561 -1.148 -0.318 -0.068 -0.045
(0.424) (0.372) (0.292) (0.912) (0.757) (0.549) (1.876) (1.336) (0.975) (0.794) (0.640) (0.476)
constant -4.008*** -3.057*** -1.299** -10.359*** -7.275*** -4.576*** -12.808*** -8.797*** -5.468*** 8.126*** 5.857*** 3.887**
(0.869) (0.787) (0.572) (2.353) (1.888) (1.436) (3.909) (2.777) (2.029) (2.602) (2.233) (1.632)
No. of observations 72 72 72 57 57 57 52 52 52 57 57 57
R 2 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.38 0.42 0.27
Joint significance test 8.17*** 5.18*** 4.85*** 6.69*** 6.8*** 5.63*** 3.6*** 3.11*** 3.3*** 11.4*** 10.66*** 8.66***
Test of excluded instruments 5.92*** 5.92*** 5.92*** 2.78** 2.78** 2.78** 10.25*** 10.25*** 10.25***
First stage partial R 2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.3 0.3 0.3
OID Test (p-value) 0.53 0.38 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.94 0.7 0.21
Standard errors in parentheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
Gini Dollar Kraay-OLS Gini Dollar Kraay-IV Gini Deininger Squire-IV Q3-IV















inequality -0.002 0.006 -0.305 -0.966 -0.665 -0.044* -0.044
(0.021) (0.016) (0.189) (0.88) (1.264) (0.027) (0.038)
natural capital share 0.005 0.026 -0.271** -0.994** -0.6 0.026 -0.007
(0.016) (0.017) (0.11) (0.483) (1.185) (0.019) (0.027)
ethnolinguistic fractionalization 1.213* 0.907 5.243 34.983 69.518 0.898 -0.452
(0.658) (0.728) (5.672) (27.202) (45.089) (0.751) (1.027)
British colony -0.219 -0.147 -0.123 4.139 -15.899 0.106 -0.156
(0.442) (0.391) (2.752) (19.164) (22.09) (0.48) (0.787)
Middle East & North Africa 0.167 1.328* -3.363 -16.354* -15.655 2.076** -1.677**
(0.462) (0.684) (3.618) (9.18) (11.643) (0.838) (0.68)
East Asia 0.627 -0.119 -6.071* -6.549 -16.476 -0.271 -1.688*
(0.761) (0.491) (3.133) (15.922) (20.792) (0.402) (0.975)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.856** 0.048 5.075 -1.359 -13.506 2.148*** -1.526**
(0.402) (0.391) (5.226) (10.48) (12.235) (0.797) (0.701)
constant 0.278 0.082 19.813** 66.792** 49.492 1.797* 4.001**
(0.767) (0.643) (8.357) (31.245) (44.407) (0.955) (1.835)
No. of observations 79 79 77 79 46 77 32
R 2 0.1 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.13 0.21 0.25
Joint significance test 1.34 1.4 1.25 1.56 0.67 2.06* 2.54**
Standard errors in parentheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
Table 5: Policy Volatility Measures
fiscal trade fiscal trade
Germany 0.02 0.02 Jamaica 0.09 0.16
France 0.02 0.03 Turkey 0.09 0.10
Netherlands 0.02 0.03 Ireland 0.09 0.04
Sweden 0.02 0.08 Benin 0.09 0.12
Austria 0.03 0.03 Peru 0.09 0.07
United Kingdom 0.03 0.03 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.09 0.09
Belgium 0.03 0.03 Bolivia 0.09 0.08
Switzerland 0.03 0.04 Syrian Arab Republic 0.10 0.17
United States 0.03 0.02 Singapore 0.10 0.15
Spain 0.03 0.04 Pakistan 0.10 0.13
Norway 0.03 0.03 Israel 0.10 0.06
Italy 0.03 0.03 Trinidad and Tobago 0.10 0.16
Japan 0.03 0.03 Lesotho 0.11 0.09
Australia 0.04 0.03 Haiti 0.11 0.19
Portugal 0.04 0.10 Chile 0.11 0.05
Canada 0.04 0.03 Ecuador 0.11 0.16
Denmark 0.04 0.02 China 0.11 0.10
Iceland 0.04 0.04 Colombia 0.11 0.06
Finland 0.04 0.05 Mali 0.11 0.12
New Zealand 0.05 0.04 Niger 0.12 0.13
Philippines 0.05 0.08 Ghana 0.12 0.20
Costa Rica 0.06 0.17 South Africa 0.12 0.09
Panama 0.06 0.08 Algeria 0.13 0.12
Cote d'Ivoire 0.06 0.08 Central African Republ 0.14 0.12
Kenya 0.06 0.11 Gabon 0.15 0.13
Tunisia 0.06 0.09 Congo, Rep. 0.16 0.16
Greece 0.06 0.15 Zimbabwe 0.16 0.14
Uruguay 0.06 0.05 Botswana 0.16 0.10
El Salvador 0.06 0.10 Rwanda 0.17 0.17
Malaysia 0.06 0.06 Malawi 0.17 0.22
Mexico 0.07 0.07 Guinea-Bissau 0.17 0.37
Paraguay 0.07 0.22 Burundi 0.17 0.37
Mauritius 0.07 0.05 Togo 0.18 0.25
Madagascar 0.07 0.13 Senegal 0.19 0.07
Honduras 0.07 0.06 Nicaragua 0.20 0.17
Hong Kong, China 0.08 0.07 Mauritania 0.20 0.13
Sri Lanka 0.08 0.07 Nigeria 0.21 0.12
Papua New Guinea 0.08 0.09 Burkina Faso 0.22 0.11
Venezuela 0.08 0.12 Dominican Republic 0.24 0.11
Guatemala 0.08 0.08 Zambia 0.24 0.23
India 0.08 0.06 Bangladesh 0.25 0.11
Fiji 0.08 0.10 Chad 0.28 0.50
Brazil 0.08 0.08 Argentina 0.29 0.08
South Korea 0.08 0.11 Cameroon 0.35 0.10
Indonesia 0.08 0.09 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.39 0.29
Morocco 0.09 0.09 Thailand 0.49 0.07
Table 6: Fiscal Policy Volatility
OLS IV
PI OLS PI FE PI GMM PI OLS PI FE PI GMM
political instability 0.223*** 0.303*** 0.312*** 0.576** 0.849*** 1.119**
(0.056) (0.067) (0.079) (0.225) (0.308) (0.527)
openness -0.001 -0.003 -0.081 0.185 0.356 0.743
(0.239) (0.235) (0.207) (0.668) (0.735) (1.015)
domestic distortions 0.664* 0.736** 0.652* 1.683* 2.052** 2.167
(0.352) (0.325) (0.330) (0.934) (0.949) (1.361)
Presidential system 0.196 0.213 0.233 -0.263 -0.232 -0.196
(0.231) (0.236) (0.257) (0.369) (0.362) (0.426)
no. of elections -0.015 -0.006 -0.044 0.031 0.060 -0.037
(0.049) (0.048) (0.045) (0.072) (0.076) (0.069)
Middle East & North Africa -0.243 -0.219 -0.188 -0.968*** -0.971** -0.873
(0.221) (0.227) (0.213) (0.357) (0.453) (0.544)
East Asia 0.108 0.057 0.017 0.033 -0.084 -0.198
(0.214) (0.205) (0.215) (0.301) (0.284) (0.299)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.079 -0.118 -0.066 -0.181 -0.298 -0.150
(0.163) (0.173) (0.182) (0.208) (0.230) (0.296)
constant -2.587*** -2.695*** -2.639*** -2.508*** -2.875*** -3.056***
(0.329) (0.309) (0.302) (0.559) (0.608) (0.689)
No. of observations 81 81 81 67 67 67
R 2 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.24
Joint significance test 9.2*** 11.76*** 7.94*** 5.21*** 3.43*** 2.6**
OID Test (p-value) 0.28 0.82 0.32
Standard errors in parentheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
Table 7: Trade Policy Volatility
PI OLS PI FE PI GMM PI OLS Import duty PI OLS PI FE PI GMM PI OLS Import duty
political instability 0.176*** 0.233*** 0.256*** 0.252*** 0.334*** 0.489*** 0.624*** 0.666***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.066) (0.072) (0.081) (0.126) (0.192) (0.208)
accession 0.009*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.011* 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
Presidential system 0.019 0.054 0.065 0.244 -0.317 -0.302 -0.362 -0.372
(0.221) (0.216) (0.235) (0.317) (0.278) (0.294) (0.361) (0.491)
no. of elections -0.052 -0.048 -0.074* -0.087 -0.030 -0.017 -0.075* -0.026
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.066) (0.033) (0.036) (0.043) (0.093)
Middle East & North Africa 0.085 0.132 0.135 -0.105 -0.076 -0.051 -0.037 -0.925
(0.156) (0.143) (0.157) (0.411) (0.138) (0.123) (0.175) (0.721)
East Asia -0.067 -0.096 -0.144 -0.484* -0.233 -0.298** -0.421*** -0.673
(0.146) (0.137) (0.127) (0.289) (0.144) (0.139) (0.145) (0.461)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.025 -0.046 -0.011 -0.153 -0.097 -0.145 -0.104 -0.239
(0.190) (0.198) (0.208) (0.257) (0.185) (0.195) (0.229) (0.350)
constant -20.517*** -18.090*** -19.995*** -20.192* -28.863*** -23.466*** -29.203*** -24.806
(6.470) (6.040) (6.424) (11.894) (8.302) (7.844) (9.074) (19.916)
No. of observations 81 81 81 73 67 67 67 61
R 2 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.39
Joint significance test 10.26*** 11.17*** 9.99*** 7.5*** 10.32*** 9.57*** 7.97*** 6.11***
OID Test (p-value) 0.03 0.19 0.15 0.35
Standard errors in parentheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
OLS IV























political instability 0.139** 0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 0.029 -0.019 0.079** -0.006 -0.002 -0.0001 0.017 0.030
(0.062) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.046) (0.037) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.050)
openness -0.163 -0.262 -0.303 -0.854** -0.253 -0.088
(0.304) (0.331) (0.357) (0.403) (0.315) (0.137)
domestic distortions 0.476 0.452 0.391 0.222 0.387 0.626**
(0.352) (0.339) (0.343) (0.635) (0.374) (0.273)
accession 0.009*** 0.009** 0.007** 0.015*** 0.009** -0.0002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Presidential system 0.361 0.380 0.384 0.020 0.343 -0.225 0.283 0.316 0.345* 0.121 0.296 -0.018
(0.248) (0.247) (0.238) (0.305) (0.251) (0.307) (0.213) (0.211) (0.195) (0.283) (0.216) (0.349)
no. of elections -0.078* -0.086* -0.080* -0.124** -0.086* -0.040 -0.094** -0.101** -0.094** -0.080 -0.104** -0.047
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.063) (0.044) (0.047) (0.042) (0.054) (0.046) (0.063)
Middle East & North Africa -0.102 -0.153 -0.181 0.334 -0.212 -0.585*** 0.048 0.018 0.039 0.691 -0.011 -0.369*
(0.185) (0.187) (0.192) (0.371) (0.198) (0.193) (0.220) (0.246) (0.237) (0.440) (0.247) (0.214)
East Asia 0.034 0.187 0.130 -0.096 0.183 -0.436*** -0.150 -0.058 -0.072 0.013 -0.026 -0.323
(0.186) (0.278) (0.252) (0.179) (0.271) (0.153) (0.136) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.229)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.112 -0.026 -0.060 0.031 -0.073 -0.498** -0.104 -0.031 -0.054 0.203 -0.080 -0.104
(0.171) (0.163) (0.162) (0.228) (0.162) (0.227) (0.189) (0.188) (0.178) (0.270) (0.193) (0.255)
constant -2.548*** -2.392*** -2.331*** -1.842*** -2.385*** -1.722*** -20.768*** -19.460*** -16.228** -31.584*** -19.584*** -1.446
(0.328) (0.325) (0.333) (0.397) (0.324) (0.350) (6.695) (6.937) (6.966) (8.023) (7.154) (10.179)
No. of observations 91 89 91 52 89 40 91 89 91 52 89 40
R 2 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.14
Joint significance test 6.94*** 4.42*** 4.42*** 3.74*** 4.67*** 5.63*** 7.92*** 6.62*** 6.26*** 5.29*** 6.77*** 1.04
Standard errors in parantheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
Fiscal Policy Volatility Trade Policy Volatility
Table 9: Output Volatility and Policy Volatility
OLS IV OLS IV Import duty-OLS
Import 
duty-IV OLS IV
fiscal policy volatility 0.413*** 0.974*** 0.224*** 0.086
(0.080) (0.270) (0.072) (0.297)
trade policy volatility 0.492*** 0.740*** 0.249*** 0.542*** 0.371*** 0.750**
(0.065) (0.139) (0.051) (0.131) (0.074) (0.303)
inflation -0.023 -0.045 -0.010 -0.009 -0.000 -0.003 -0.018 -0.014
(0.021) (0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.021)
terms of trade volatility 0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 0.005* 0.000 0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) -0.003 (0.005)
exchange rate overvaluation 0.002* 0.000 0.002* 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
government expenditure 0.076 0.557* 0.125 0.270 -0.187 0.099 0.208 0.358
(0.151) (0.324) (0.151) (0.168) (0.182) (0.213) (0.131) (0.250)
openness 0.130 0.175** 0.100 0.099* 0.320** 0.547*** 0.126 0.102
(0.130) (0.084) (0.094) (0.055) (0.132) (0.130) (0.081) (0.067)
constant 1.896*** 2.475*** 2.003*** 2.468*** 1.240*** 0.421 2.116*** 2.543***
(0.390) (0.503) (0.343) -0.364 (0.457) (0.570) (0.304) (0.385)
No. of observations 85 77 85 77 76 71 85 77
R 2 0.52 0.39 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.41 0.64 0.56
Joint significance test 10.54*** 20.92*** 10.29*** 16.7*** 11.68*** 23.78*** 7.41***
OID Test (p-value) 0.64 0.76 0.9 0.87
Standard errors in parantheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
Table 10: Decadal Regressions





inequality 0.017 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.023
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019)
constant -1.158 -2.195*** -2.368*** -1.939*** -1.863*** -1.239
(0.875) (0.731) (0.683) (0.597) (0.413) (0.802)
No. of observations 36 47 58 63 204 204
R 2 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.01
Joint significance test 0.75 9.95*** 7.47*** 8.80*** 15.96*** 1.41





political instability 0.135** 0.099* 0.119** 0.325*** 0.133*** 0.100***
(0.066) (0.051) (0.051) (0.064) (0.029) (0.032)
constant 2.414*** 2.601*** 2.339*** 2.298*** 2.418*** 2.394***
(0.098) (0.057) (0.060) (0.077) (0.055) (0.028)
No. of observations 64 81 80 81 306 306
R 2 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.11 0.04
Joint significance test 4.23** 3.85* 5.49** 26.12*** 21.71*** 9.93***





political instability 0.178** 0.057 0.162*** 0.305*** 0.136*** 0.089**
(0.082) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.033) (0.036)
constant 1.831*** 2.490*** 2.387*** 2.309*** 2.272*** 2.244***
(0.096) (0.064) (0.062) (0.073) (0.060) (0.032)
No. of observations 65 81 81 81 308 308
R 2 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.23 0.1 0.03
Joint significance test 4.74** 1.00 8.04*** 27.30*** 17.56*** 5.93**
Standard errors in parentheses; *** - significant at 1% level, ** - significant at 5% level * - significant at 10% level
In the first stage regressions, we regress Polity on per capita GDP, schooling, gender inequality in schooling, an oil
dummy and by decade. We use Arellano-Bond GMM system estimator to run the first stage regressions by decade 
and calculate political instability as the standard error of the residuals. 
Policy volatility is calculated in the same way by decade.We use the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
